As entrepreneurial businesses, accountancy firms have supplemented their traditional trade of selling accounting and auditing services by diversifying into a variety of other products and services. They have developed organisational struc tures and strategies to sell tax avoidance schemes to corporations and wealthy individuals. The sale of such services shifts tax burdens to less mobile capital and less well-off citizens. It also erodes the tax base and brings the firms into direct conflict with the state. This paper provides some evidence of the strategies and tactics used by accountancy firms to sell schemes that enable their clients to avoid corporate, sales and payroll taxes. Such strategies stimulate reflections upon the possible trajectories in the development of accountancy firms and social consequences of their trade.
Introduction
The neo-liberal economic theories facilitating globalization have so reduced territorial frontiers that capital roams the world looking for jurisdictions and networks that offer a refuge for high profits, low tax and minimal social obligations jurisdictions. The triumphant march of global capitalism may produce enormous economic activity, trade and wealth, but it is also accompanied by extreme poverty, social exclusion and huge inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth, and quality of life for everyone. The dismantling of exchange controls and trade barriers, accompanied by innovations in communications technologies, has encouraged the development of a rapacious tax avoidance industry, with ordinary citizens, equality, democracy, justice and fairness as the visible casualties.
Despite record corporate profits and economic growth, over four billion people live on less than $2 a day; 1.8 billion people lack access to electricity. In 1960, at the dawn of large-scale tax avoidance, the richest 20 percent in the world accounted for about 70 percent of total income. However, by 2000, that figure had reached 85 percent 1 . Over the same period, the fraction of income accruing to the poorest 20 percent in the world fell from 2.3 percent to 1.1 percent (Prahalad, 2004) . These inequalities are also a feature of affluent countries. In Britain, world's fourth biggest and Europe's second richest economy, the share of wealth enjoyed by the poorest 50% of the population has shrunk from 10 per cent in 1986 to 5 per cent in 2002 (New Statesman, 7 March 2005 . One-in-three children (3.8 million children) live in poverty (Barnardo's, 2003 persons only receive 30%, and this is available for only six months, after which various social assistance benefits can be obtained, but they are low enough to leave many in a poverty trap. In Sweden and Denmark, benefits adding up to 60% of the average wage can be claimed for up to five years.
People may look to elected governments to make the necessary investment in social infrastructure and eradicate social inequalities or use the taxation system to redistribute wealth and enable more people to live fulfilling lives, but such aspirations are increasingly checked by the tax avoidance industry dominated by accountants, lawyers and bankers. Britain may be losing more than £100 billion of tax revenues 2 each year (Lyssiotou et al., 2004; Marsden, 2004 (Oxfam, 2000) whilst paying £100 million (or around US$190 million) a day in debt repayments alone to richer countries (Oxfam, 2004) . Deprived of social investment, average life expectancy in some African nations has declined to just 33 years.
The global tax avoidance industry is attracting increasing attention by policymakers (for example, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998, 2000; Financial Action Task Force, 2000a , 2000b , 2000c Financial Stability Forum, 2000; US General Accountability Office, 2003 , 2004a , 2004b ; UK Home Office, 1998) and scholars (for example, see Hampton, 1996; Palan, 2003) , but comparatively little scholarly attention is focused upon the role of accountancy firms in facilitating tax avoidance (Mitchell et al., 2002; Sikka, 2003 The third section concludes the paper by considering some social implications of this commercialisation of accountancy firms.
PROFESSIONALISM AND PURSUIT OF PROFITS
In societies marked by divisions of expert labour, accountants distinguish themselves from competing occupational groups by drawing attention to a number of traits or characteristics (Millerson, 1964) . These include claims of theoretical and practical knowledge, high level of skills, ethical conduct and social responsibility. Appeals to such idealised self-images help to solicit trust and legitimise professional power. They are part of the politics that enable accountants to secure considerable work autonomy and define the needs of clients and society (Flint, 1988) . However, accountancy firms do not simply trade by appealing to idealised claims. As entrepreneurial businesses, they constantly reinvent themselves (Daly and Schuler, 1998) and translate their images and technical knowledge claims into fees and markets by stimulating demands for new products and services and by creating appropriate organisational cultures, structures and strategies to meet and expand them (Larson, 1977; MacDonald, 1995) .
Historically, the state guaranteed monopoly of external auditing has been the making of accountancy firms. Unlike other consultancy businesses, it gives them comparatively easy access to company executives and provides an opening to impress potential clients with zeal about meeting deadlines, attention to detail, the value of surveillance, judgement, control and related implications o f cutting costs and inefficiencies (Willmott and Sikka, 1997) . Until, the late 1960s, accounting and auditing services formed the 'core business' for accountancy firms, but their relative contribution to firm profits has stagnated. In common with other capitalist enterprises, accountancy firms have sought to mobilise their technical knowledge to develop complementary products and adjacent markets, including the sale of tax avoidance schemes (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a; Financial Reporting Council, 2005) . In addition to cementing jurisdictional claims (Abbott, 1988) and increasing the partners' share of profits (Burrows and Black, 1998) , the expansion into tax avoidance services exploits deeply ingrained individualist discourses claiming that "every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax" (IRC v. Duke of Westminster (1936 ) 19 TC 490, [1936 As commercial concerns, accountancy firms prioritise private profits and encourage competitive individualism, with an emphasis on retaining clients, pleasing the customer and promoting business virtues that increase profits (Grey, 1998; Barrett et al., 2005) . To sell tax avoidance and other services, firms need to develop organisational cultures and practices that place increasing emphasis upon the commercial acumen of their staff and it is this commercial acumen, rather than the ethical conduct, or even the technical ability of the firms' staff that is increasingly promoted as the primary measure of their trustworthiness. As a partner of a major accountancy firm put it, "a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom line is that …... first of all the individual must contribute to the profitability of the business. In part that is bringing in business but essentially profitability is based upon the ability to serve existing clients well" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 121) .
Accountancy firms are part of the contemporary 'enterprise culture' that persuades many to believe that 'bending the rules' for personal gain is a sign of business acumen. Stealing a march on a competitor to make money, at almost any price, is considered to be an entrepreneurial skill, especially where competitive pressures link promotion, status, profits, markets and niches with meeting business targets (Sikka, 2004) . The intellectual and moral outlook of employees is shaped by socialisation and inculcation from senior staff that emphasises retention of clients. Such practices are given visibility by senior partners instructing staff that "The first requirement is to continue to be at the beck and call of RM [Robert Maxwell 5 was chairman of the company], his sons and staff, appear when wanted and provide whatever is required"
(UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2001, p. 367) . In pursuit of profits, firms have been keen to retain known problematical clients on the grounds that they are "a big fee account" (Joint Disciplinary Scheme, 2004) . Such a focus on private profits does not appear to be accompanied by concerns about public obligatio ns, persuading Hanlon (1994) to conclude that within major firms the "emphasis is very firmly on being commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 150) .
The commercialisation of accountancy firms is shaping and is shaped by broader 6 Such a view is contested by Christensen and Kapoor, 2004. 7 As the chairman of Coopers & Lybrand (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) put it, "there is an ind ustry developing, and we are part of it, in standards avoidance" (Accountancy Age, 19 July 1990, p. 1). 8 Information is taken from the most recent annual review of the relevant firm.
worldwide presence has enabled the Big Four firms to generate global income of $55 billion global income and become the 53 rd biggest economy in the world (Cousins et al., 2004) . Firms have expanded their consultancy operations ( Financial Reporting Council, 2005) and selling tax avoidance schemes is a major source of revenues (Mitchell et al., 2002) . 
ACCOUNTAN TS AND TAX AVOIDANCE
The intensification of commercialisation of accountancy firms is highly evident in their strategies for selling tax avoidance schemes. The sale of tax avoidance schemes is not a new phenomenon; however what is interesting is the variety of schemes and the tactics used by accountancy firms to sell them. This section provides some evidence by drawing attention to the strategies used to sell schemes that help clients to avoid corporate, sales and payroll taxes.
Corporate Taxes
The demise of US-based energy company Enron focussed worldwide public attention on organised large-scale tax avoidance. The "foresight of top management" is unlikely to be found as an 'intangible asset' in any accounting text-book 12 . However, it could be conceptualised as management's strategy to create a horizontally and vertically integrated corporate structure to provide a range of service to customers, something any company would strive for. To 10 Cayman Islands, in common with many other tax havens, do not levy any tax on income and profits. 11 A variety of trademarks and trade names were also licensed to WorldCom subsidiaries. 12 In accounting, something is considered to be an asset if meets a number of tests, including its severability and ability to be sold to third parties for cash. PricewaterhouseCoopers' senior tax partner told the subcommittee that "In the 1990s
there was increasing pressure in the marketplace for firms to develop aggressive tax shelters that could be marketed to large numbers of taxpayers ….. regrettably, our firm became involved in three types of these transactions 14 ". However, the Senate Subcommittee homed in on KPMG because in the words of one of its members, "this was one of the worst perpetrators ……. they were involved more heavily than any other firm that we could find 15 ". Senate report concluded that "none of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee derived from a request by a specific corporation or individual for tax planning advice on how to structure a specific business transaction in a tax efficient way; rather all of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee involved generic tax products that had been affirmatively developed by a firm and then vigorously marketed to numerous, in some cases thousands, of potential buyers" (p. 2).
KPMG had an elaborate organisational structure for developing and marketing tax avoidance schemes, including a 'Tax Innovation Center' whose sole mission was to develop new tax products (p. 30). It operated a "Tax Services Idea Bank" and invited staff to submit new ideas for tax products on an internal form which also asked submitter to explain the revenue potential, typical buyer and key target markets. The 'center' operated as a profit centre and was subjected to a performance monitoring regime. KPMG maintained an extensive marketing infrastructure to sell its tax products, including a telemarketing centre staffed with people trained to make cold calls to find buyers for specific tax products. The Senate reports stated that the firm 16 The firm has close relationship with the UK state and has advised the government on possible reforms of tax havens (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2000) . 17 They are also referred to as "tax solutions" or "tax strategies" (US Senate Permanent subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 26) 18 These included Deutsche Bank, HVB and Wachovia Bank, and inevitably raise some questions about auditor independence and possible conflict of interests.
"utilized confidential and sensitive client data in an internal database containing information used by KPMG to prepare client tax returns in order to identify potential targets for its tax products" (p. 9). Tax professionals and audit staff were required to work together to sell and implement the product and internal communications told staff that the tax product is a "collection of assurance and tax services designed to assist companies in …….. realizing value from intellectual property …… delivered by joint team of KPMG assurance and tax professionals ….. to increase KPMG's market penetration of key clients and targets by enhancing the linkage between Assurance and Tax professionals" (p. 54)
In the secretive world of tax avoidance and concerns about intellectual property, KPMG required some potential purchasers to sign "nondisclosure agreements" (p.
14). Client presentations were done on chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and written materia ls were retrieved from clients before leaving a meeting. KPMG staff were advised to clean out their files and not to retain some information. The Senate
Committee was also unhappy in that it believed that contrary to professional rules and regulations, the firm charged "contingency fees" for selling tax avoidance schemes to audit clients (p. 15).
Over the years, thousands of corporations had been approached by KPMG to aggressively sell its tax products. Extensive pressure was placed on staff, including professional accountants and lawyers, to sell the firm's generic tax products. One internal e-mail asked staff to "temporarily defer non-revenue producing activities" and concentrate for the "next 5 months" on meeting revenue goals for the year", and added "Listed below are the tax product identified by the functional teams as having significant revenue potential over the next few months……". Another senior person said, "We are dealing with ruthless execution -hand to hand combat -blocking and tackling.' Whatever the mixed metaphor, let's just do it." (pp. 8-9) ….. "you must respond aggressively at every opportunity" (p.50). Staff were advised to tell some clients that some products were no longer available, "apparently hoping that reverse psychology would then cause the client to want to buy the product" (p. 9). There was guidance on how to convince sceptical clients (p. 58) with phrases such as "Many of the [KPMG] specialists are ex-IRS employee; …. Many sophisticated clients have implemented the strategy in conjunction with their outside counsel; ….. call the client and say that the firm has decided to cap the strategy … and the cap is quickly filling up" p. 59). Some clients were worried about possible future litigation by the tax authorities and such uncertainties were mediated by securing 'opinion letters' 19 from selected lawyers and by telling buyers that they could purchase suitable insurance cover from named insurance companies.
The US Inland Revenue Service (IRS) requires firms to register certain kind of tax products, but the Senate report noted that "Despite its 500 active tax product inventory KPMG has never registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS the existence of, a single one of its tax products …….." (p. 13), possibly because it believed tha t its products were beyond the scope of the legislation. However, the Senate report refers to an internal e-mail, in which a senior KPMG official suggested that the firm should not register its tax products with the IRS, even if required by law because the IRS was not vigorously enforcing the registration requirements and that the penalties were much less than the potential profits. The KPMG calculated that based "upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, we conclude that the penalties would be no greater than $14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. ... For example, our average [OPIS 20 ] deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000." The senior tax professional also warned that if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place the firm at such a competitive disadvantage in its sales that KPMG would "not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products market" (p. 13).
A KPMG tax partner told the Subcommittee that the tax strategies " represent an earlier time" and that the firm now does not sell "any aggressive tax strategies specifically designed to be sold to multiple clients 21 ". After the Senate hearings, the firm announced a number of organisational and personne l changes (The Observer, 25
January 2004) and Senator Carl Levin stated that the Subcommittee "investigation 19 The Senate report states that "KPMG had drafted its own prototype tax opinion letter supporting the product and used this prototype as a template for the letters it actually sent to its clients. In addition ……. KPMG arranged for an outside law firm to provide a second favourable opinion letter" (p. 11). 20 This is an acronym for a tax product. PricewaterhouseCoopers also sold generic tax products which were "potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters" (p. 7 and 93).
Sales Taxes
With pressure on corporate taxes, some states have shifted taxes to consumption 23 (or sales). However, this too has attracted the attention of the tax avoidance industry. In common with other members of the European Union (EU) Britain rais es tax revenues by levying Value Added Tax (VAT) on the supply of most goods and services 24 . In essence, the supplier charges tax ("output tax") at a statutory rate (currently 17.5%) on sales. The supplier can offset the VAT paid on purchases ("input tax") against the output tax and the difference is settled with payments/receipts to the Customs & The scheme flowed from a cold-call (6 January 2000) from KPMG, which had no previous relationship with the company, to Mr Garland, a director of UK-based RAL Holdings Group. The firm offered to make a presentation of a possible VAT savings in respect of gaming and amusement machines subject to a confidentiality undertaking being given (London Tribunal Centre, 2002, para 9) . On 28 January the presentation titled "KPMG's VAT Mitigation Proposals for Gaming and Amusement Machines" was given to company directors. It contrasted £4.2 million VAT then payable with a nil liability using a Channel Islands company ("CICo"). CICo would recover VAT on the site rental, if opted for tax, and on the machines. KPMG would charge £75,000 for an evaluation report and counsel's opinion and a fee of 25 per cent of the first year's
25
A transcript of the case, details and judgement is available on http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/decisions/seldecisions/decision/v17914.ht m; accessed 28 February 2004. 26 The Channel Islands (including Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark) are UK Crown Dependencies but are neither part of the UK nor the European Union. 27 In many ways the position is no different from that of a tourist who visits London, buys goods and then seeks to reclaim the VAT paid on those purchases.
VAT savings, 15 per cent of the second and 5 per cent of the next three year's savings.
The biggest benefit of the scheme was claimed to be "enhanced shareholder value" (para 70). The "predominant aim is to increase group profitability by reducing the amount of VAT paid by the group after taking account of VAT recovered by the group" (para 70 (18)).
In March 2000, KPMG were formally appointed advisers to the company and in due course presented a 16 page report (15 Jun 2000) containing details of the scheme. The scheme, as explained to the London Tribunal, related to gaming machines operated in the UK by companies i n the RAL Holdings Ltd group. Under the scheme gaming machines in 127 amusement arcades in the UK were to be leased to a newly formed Channel Islands subsidiary company, which was granted licences by a group company in the UK to use the arcades. Another UK subsidiary contracted with the Channel Islands company was to provide the staff at the arcades. Under the plan, all the gaming machine operations would take place in the UK except accounting and "machine management" and complaints handling which would take place from Guernsey in the Channel Islands. The UK operations had 600 staff compared to two full-time staff and two part-time directors in Guernsey. The basis of the scheme was that the place of supply of gaming machine services to customers would be shown to be in Guernsey and that the Channel Islands company would be entitled to repayment of input tax on supplies made to it without being liable to any output tax. Before the scheme, a single UK subsidiary made the supplies and output tax was paid to the Customs authorities.
The KPMG 'action plan' listed 83 steps necessary to make the scheme work. These included matters such as the creation of the appropriate group structures, appointment of directors, place of board meetings, details of employee contacts and details of operations. The 16 page KPMG report also acknowledged possible challenges from the UK authorities and stated that "In our view HM Customs & Excise ('Customs') will regard these planning arrangements as 'unacceptable tax avoidance' and will seek to challenge the arrangements. However, a similar concept for telecommunications ran for nearly four years in most Member States of the EU before the UK, French and German Governments secured the unanimous agreement of all 15 Member States to amend the primary legislation and stop the concept" and added "Since at the moment we are not aware of any widespread use of these planning arrangements, and the fact (sic) that some EU Member States do not charge VAT on gaming machine income, unanimous agreement to amend the EC legislation could be difficult to achieve" (para 22 of the Tribunal judgement). The report also stated that prior advice from KPMG must be taken on VAT and direct tax issues before new sites or businesses are acquired to ensure the benefits of the new arrangements are not prejudiced.
After implementing the tax avoidance scheme, refunds of nearly £6.6 million were sought and refused by the UK Customs authorities. The decision hinged on whether the taxable supplies (or sales) were made by "fixed establishments" in the UK or in Guernsey. The VAT Tribunal dismissed the claim for refunds because it considered that the fixed establishments at the arcades in the UK constituted the place of supply.
The company and KPMG 28 subsequently appealed to the European Court of Justice and a preliminary decisio n by the EU Advocate General declared the avoidance scheme to be 'unacceptable' on the ground that such a state of affairs would distort competition within the EU (The Observer, 30 January 2005).
Payroll Taxes
With globalisation and the nesting of corporations and wealthy individuals in 'fictitious spaces' facilitated by tax havens (Roberts, 1994) , many states have been obliged to increase taxes on less mobile capital and employment. In the UK, all employed persons are obliged to pay two types of direct taxes. These are 'income tax'
and 'National Insurance Contributions (NIC). The NICs act like tax on earnings but their payment entitles individuals to certain social security benefits and a state pension.
Above a pre-defined threshold, all employed persons, including the self-employed, are required to make payments. Generally, higher earners are expected to pay more.
28 Many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are also becoming concerned about organaised tax avoidance and its social consequences. In January 2005, KPMG was awarded an international prize, awarded by the world's leading NGOs, for "corporate irresponsibility" for promoting aggressive tax avoidance (The Guardian, 27 January 2005). The related press related press release is available on the AABA website ( http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/DAVOS.pdf) together with the speech justifying the selection of KPMG (http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/Davosspeech.pdf).
However, the NIC also functions as an employment tax in that the employer is obliged to pay an amount per employee, determined by the salary of the employee, to the Inland Revenue. Thus the typical total cost of employing a person consists of salary, NIC and any pension contributions. Since this increases the employment costs for companies, the tax avoidance industry has developed a variety of schemes to enable companies and high earners to avoid payroll taxes. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In the sociological literature, accountancy firms are regarded as a profession and assigned baggage o f social responsibility and ethical conduct. However, this overlooks that major firms are a 'fraction' of capital with global presence and networks (Hampton, 1996) . As fractions of capital, firms have always operated in intensely competitive arenas, competing with both other fractions of capital and also amongst themselves to sell products and services. This competition generates pressure on profitability and the need to continually develop new products and find commercial ways of selling their services. To increase profits, major firms mobilise individualist discourses and encourage their clients to report higher earnings, often with little regard for the collective social consequences. They have created elaborate corporate structures, and marketing techniq ues to sell tax avoidance schemes to corporations and rich clients. These are developed and marketed through a network of banks and lawyers and sold with considerable emphasis on secrecy and confidentiality.
The publicly available evidence cited in this paper shows that major firms deploy elaborate techniques for cold-calling and reassuring sceptical clients. At least one firm performed a private cost-benefit analysis to decide that the profits for marketing a scheme considerably exceeded the likely penalties for selling dubious schemes and then proceeded to sell the tax avoidance schemes. On occasions, firms themselves have suspected that they may be engaged in 'unacceptable tax avoidance', but nevertheless sold the schemes. The so-called 'Chinese Walls' do not seem to prevent the firms from selling tax avoidance schemes to audit clients and then claiming to independently attest the resulting transactions. In selling tax avoidance schemes, the firms regard company directors as clients rather than other stakeholders who may have to suffer the possible consequences of lower social investment. Within highly commercialised accountancy firms there is a fundamental shift "from providing oneto-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also initiating, designing and mass marketing of tax shelter products" ( US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005, p. 9).
The highly commercialised tax avoidance industry operates in most countries. As
Enron and other episodes show, developing and transitional economies countries are also affected and are deprived of vital revenues for their social investment. Due to lack of social investment, many fellow human beings are unable to secure the basic essentials of healthcare, education, transport, sanitation, clean water, pensions and other public goods. Tax avoidance also distorts 'fair competition' so beloved by neo-liberals. It enables major corporations and their rich patrons to avoid making social contributions, something smaller capital or less mobile capital cannot. The obvious logic to this is that all businesses should avoid taxes. However, this also poses major dilemmas in that without adequate revenues, the necessary social order and legitimacy that is so necessary for the smooth accumulation of profits cannot be maintained.
Organised and aggressive tax avoidance raises major questions about the assumed social responsibility and ethics of accountancy firms and their rich clients, but such issues attract little attention in the bourgeoning corporate social responsibility and accounting literature (Christensen and Murphy, 2004) even though some of the episodes are regularly reported in newspapers (Bougen et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 2002 whilst for the same period, despite record company profits and average rates of return of 11.5% against an annual inflation rate of 3-4%, the take from corporate taxes increased from £21.5 billion to only £28.1 billion 32 . Corporate share of total UK tax take has dropped from 11.5 per cent in 1997/98 to 7.7 per cent in (BDO Stoy Hayward, 2004 ) and amounts to less than 2.5% of the British GDP, the lowest ever (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005 Sociological literature draws attention to a close (but complex) relationship between the state and accountancy profession (Johnson, 1972 (Johnson, , 1980 which enables the state to manage and displace its crisis of legitimacy ( Sikka and Willmott, 1995b) . Such theories now face additional layers of complexity as accountancy firms develop and market tax avoidance schemes t hat have a potential to deprive the state of large amounts of tax revenues. The erosion of tax revenues can threaten the legitimacy of the state by undermining its ability to provide public goods and the carefully propagated belief that it addresses common social interests (Hampton and Christensen, 2002) . The global tax avoidance industry poses serious challenges to the future of democracy and the nation-state itself. Elected governments may be mandated by citizens to raise and spend tax revenues on healthcare, education, pensions, clean water, transport and other essentials, but the highly commercialised tax avoidance industry is no respecter of such mandates. In appeasing major corporations and rich individuals, the tax avoidance industry may market dubious avoidance schemes that erode tax revenues and thus prevent governments from carrying out their democratically agreed mandate. The tax avoidance industry thus effectively vetoes the will of the people and in the process undermines public confidence in the democratic process. Major accountancy firms have used their financial and political resources to oppose major curbs on the sale of tax avoidance schemes although periodically -in an attempt to 'catch up' -some states revise antiavoidance legislation and have he ld inquiries to expose some blatant tax avoidance schemes. This may bring some temporary relief but has so far failed to check the distorted enterprise culture which values private profits more highly than social investment through taxes. The possibilities of curbing the tax avoidance industry are further complicated because "globalisation and technological change has made it easier to avoid paying taxes so you have to introduce more anti-avoidance measures just to stand still [and] government's attempts to raise revenues by tackling tax avoidance will inevitably be countered by the tax planning industry" (Financial Times, 9 March 2005) . Indeed, anarchy of the markets only recognises financial rewards and a partner of a major accountancy firm has stated that "No matter what legislation is in place, the accountants and lawyers will find a way around it. Rules are rules, but rules are meant to be broken" (The Guardian, 18 March 2004) .
A sustained focus upon the tax avoidance industry offers rich possibilities for interdisciplinary research (Hasseldine and Li, 1999) as it provides a window for studying some of the major questions facing the world today and opens up fresh perspectives on the role of accounting, accountants, other professionals (e.g. la wyers and bankers), trajectories of entrepreneurial culture, corporate social responsibility, poverty, corporate power, world trade, corporate governance, ethics, limits of law, futures of the state, democracy, corporate power, global geopolitics, and reconstitution of global political economy and much more. The evidence can also help us to revise theories of the state, globalisation and the professions and enable development of new vocabularies, public policies and agendas to highlight the predatory nature of capitalism and anti-social activities of professions.
